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This thesis as its title suggests explores the political landscape o f  County Cavan in the 
early part o f the last century. These were years o f major political upheaval in Ireland. 
The country was in the process o f reinventing itself both culturally and politically and 
in Cavan the forces that drove these changes were clearly manifested. In 1912 County 
Cavan was and integral part o f the United Kingdom o f Great Britain a mere ten years 
later it was the northern frontier o f the newly formed Irish Free State.
Between the years o f 1912 and 1922 Ireland experienced two simultaneous 
revolutions. The Catholics o f Ireland were on the main nationalists and their long 
struggle toward self determination and independence rapidly gathered pace during this 
period. In response to this the Protestants o f Ireland who espoused a British identity 
created a movement known as Unionism dedicated to preserving the union with Great 
Britain. The demographic religious make up of Ireland resulted in Unionists being 
most concentrated in the north o f Ireland in the province o f Ulster, while nationalism 
predominated in the other three provinces. Geography therefore became central to 
both ideologies. While nationalists insisted on national determination on an all Ireland 
basis, Unionists in the north o f the country fostered an Ulster Unionist identity that 
sought to exclude all Ulster from any form of Irish independence.
The county o f Cavan was caught upon this political and cultural tidal wave, it 
was an Ulster county, but it was on the main Catholic and nationalist, and yet it also 
contained a large Protestant and Unionist minority. Because o f Cavan's unique 
demographics, as this thesis demonstrates, it reacted quite differently to the rest of 
Ulster and indeed to the rest o f Ireland during this time. Both Unionists and 
nationalists sought control o f the county’s political destiny. This thesis traces the 
uncertain future o f the south Ulster county of Cavan from the Home Rule crisis of 
1912, right through to the partition o f Ireland in 1920 and the subsequent inclusion of 
the county in the Irish Free State It demonstrates how external and internal forces 
sometimes acting together and sometimes conflicting gave Cavan a very distinctive 
part to play in the history o f the period, one that cannot be understated and one that 
could not go unexplored.
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In tro d u c tio n
Ulster is one of the historic and ancient provinces o f the island of Ireland. The 
county o f Cavan is the most southerly o f  the nine counties that make up this 
northern province. These territorial divisions or shires are a remnant o f the 
English conquest, so too is the inclusion of County Cavan in this old province. 
The area Cavan now occupies from its earliest history has always been a frontier 
territory of sorts on the island. It was one of the original ‘six counties’ during the 
Ulster Plantation, carved from the ancient kingdom of Breifne. The area still 
bears the marks of this historic and turbulent period. Local place names like 
Virginia, Ashfield, Mount Nugent and Mountainlodge are testament to this. It is 
a dramatic landscape of rolling drumlins, bogs, rivers, and lakes reinforcing 
Cavan’s distinctive nature. The local English dialect further emphasises this fact. 
It is full o f common Ulster idioms, expressions and words yet the local accent is 
almost flat reflecting Cavan’s limbo state between north and south.
This thesis will explore a further aspect o f Cavan’s dichotomous nature, 
that o f political division. Between 1912 and 1922 it can now be said in retrospect 
that Ireland experienced two simultaneous revolutions. At the time Ireland to 
many spectators o f its political and cultural landscape and indeed to many o f its 
inhabitants, seemed on the verge o f collapse and anarchy. A civil war that 
threatened to engulf not only Ireland but also its neighbour Great Britain loomed 
large on the horizon. In the predominately Catholic south there was the 
culmination o f a long struggle for independence and national self-determination. 
In Ireland’s northern province o f Ulster quite a different revolution was coming 
to completion. The majority o f the population of the province o f Ulster were 
predominately Protestant and identified themselves as British. They were 
alienated from a sense o f Irishness by the increasingly Catholic and separatist 
outlook o f Irish nationalism. They therefore began to affirm and cultivate a new 
Ulster identity based on Protestantism, and their real or imagined cultural links 
with the island of Great Britain. ‘Once Nationalism and Orangeism confronted 
each other directly on the ground during the nationalist “Invasion o f Ulster”
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from 1883 onwards, both camps were aiming to demonstrate territorial 
supremacy.’1
This thesis will explore the dual revolutions as they unfolded in Cavan. It 
was in Cavan that the two ideologies o f Unionism and nationalism came head to 
head.2 The dissertation will assess why Cavan’s political landscape developed in 
the way that it did. It will examine the many local, provincial, and national 
organisations, institutions and movements that were present in the area during 
the period and how they functioned, acted and indeed interacted. Cavan had a 
high concentration of Orange and Ancient Order o f Hibernian Lodges. It had a 
plethora of religious denominations although Roman Catholicism was the largest 
throughout the period in question. This thesis explores the many cultural 
institutions that blossomed in Cavan during this period like The Gaelic League, 
The Gaelic Athletic Association and Unionist Clubs and how they influenced the 
outlook o f the local population.
The study will move beyond a mere linear narrative o f historical events as 
they unfolded and in doing so paint a  clear image o f the county during the 
revolutionary era 1912 -1922. This thesis is the story o f Cavan and its people, 
during ten o f the most important years o f Irish history o f the last century. These 
were years that resulted in the evolution o f two polarized communities, with 
divergent aspirations for their county’s future.
Ulster contained a large population o f Catholics, who unlike Protestants 
did not identify with a sense o f being Ulster-British, or believe in a separate 
Ulster identity. The county o f Cavan contrasted with most other Ulster counties, 
which had on the main majority or sizable Protestant populations. It was 
predominately Catholic with a substantial Protestant minority. In this small 
county o f just over ninety thousand people a completely different set o f forces 
came into play. Cavan became an exception to the rule in Ulster as it was swept 
along by national and international occurrences. It was this territory both these 
so called ‘camps’ sought to hold and control. Through the period in question
1 Frank Wright, Two lands one soil (Dublin, 1996) p.22
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because o f reversed demographic conditions and its unique geographical location 
in relation to the other counties o f the province this thesis will show that the 
county’s experience of 1912-1922 was very much different to the rest o f the 
province and indeed to the rest o f Ireland.
Cavan was the home of the first leader o f Ulster Unionism Colonel 
Edward Saunderson and sometimes remembered as its father.3 Even after his 
death his memory was a powerful force within Cavan and indeed Ulster 
Unionism. His legacy was that Unionism became an integral part o f life in 
Cavan. Cavan it can also be argued witnessed the single most important by- 
election in modem Irish history an election fought between the waning Irish 
Party and Sinn Fein in 1918. It was a bitterly contested election won by a man 
that would become part o f the iconography of nationalist Ireland, Arthur Griffith. 
This election too would have reverberating effects on the nationalist landscape of 
Cavan.
The single most important event during this period for Cavan was the 
Government o f Ireland Act o f 1920. This Act not only partitioned Ireland but 
also Ulster. The Ulster Crisis, the Great War and the 1916 Rising all had 
dramatic effects on Cavan. Cavan was caught on a cultural and political tidal 
wave that carried it to independence. Much of the forces that drove Cavan during 
this period were external and beyond the control o f the local communities.
The relative proximity in historical terms of our own time to the period 
and subject this thesis will cover, the revolutionary era o f 1912 to 1922 in south 
Ulster, has greatly affected the quantity and the quality o f secondary sources 
available to the reader. At a national level the period for a great many years was 
taboo. For nationalist historians as well as Unionist, the anomalous position of 
the three Ulster counties in the South was a constant reminder o f the incomplete
2 U nionist and U nionism  w ill appear throughout in order to  differentiate the terms from  the labour union  
m ovem ent.
3Saunderson, C ol. Edward (1837  -  1906). B o m  in C ounty Cavan at the fam ily hom e o f  Castle 
Saunderson, he w a s a Liberal M P for Cavan 1865 - 1874 and w as a C onservative M P for Armagh 1885 - 
1906. H e w as one o f  the main organisers o f  Irish U nion ism  and later becam e the first leader o f  the Irish 
U nionist parliamentary party. H e w as also h ighly active in the Orange Order from 1882 until his death in 
1906. See S. J C onnolly The Oxford com panion to  Irish history (O xford, 1998) p497
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revolutions on both sides, best forgotten or at least ignored. Cavan disappears 
out o f most histories o f Ulster after partition and is rarely considered worthy o f 
remark in histories o f Ireland. At a local level historical analysis o f the period 
also remained scant. There are a myriad of possible reasons for this. Firstly, the 
county’s historical relationship with Northern Ireland and the continuing 
‘Troubles’ north o f the border, alternatively the area may simply have been 
thought to have played such an insignificant part in the history of the period. 
What was really at play in Cavan was a collective conscious amnesia. The local 
historical society Cumann Seannchais Breifne clearly demonstrates this. In its 
journal Breifne for a great many years the contributors tended to concentrate the 
greater amount o f their energies and essays on the county’s remote and non- 
controversial past It could be argued that this was because they in general found 
the locality’s distant past more interesting therefore worthy o f analysis and 
narrative. This is a valid point, but it is debatable that at a local level the 
historians o f the area were possibly reflecting a consensus, that because o f the 
relative immediacy of the events in question, it was best to leave them for fear o f 
opening old wounds. This has thankfully changed in recent years. Irish 
historiography in all forms Unionist, nationalist and local has matured and 
grown more confident and there is a marked increase in publications and 
dissertations dealing with what was once seen as a ‘no go’ subject. The late 
realization o f this is that much work still remains to be done on south Ulster 
especially Cavan. For that reason this thesis is on the main a virgin study. Dr 
Terence Dooley a historian from county Monaghan notes, ‘In recent years the 
development o f Unionism in the province o f Ulster has been the subject o f an 
outpouring o f books and essays. However the vast majority o f these works 
convey the impression that the movement predominated only in the six north­
eastern counties which today form Northern Ireland and with few exceptions, 
they only fleetingly refer to the contribution o f Unionism to life in the other 
Ulster counties o f Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan in the recent years prior to the 
establishment o f the Irish Free State.’4 Dr Dooley has begun the process of
4 Terence D oo ley , The P light o f  M onaghan Protestants (D ublin, 2000 ) p8
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redressing the neglected historiography o f Co. Monaghan another south Ulster 
county in his book, The plight o f  Monaghan Protestants. No such work has yet 
been completed for Cavan. The neglect o f Cavans history from a Protestant and 
Unionist standpoint has been replicated from a Catholic and nationalist one also. 
Marianne Elliott in her publication, The Catholics o f  Ulster attempts to redress 
this imbalance.5 In this book she examines the different Ulster Catholic and 
nationalist experience to the rest o f Ireland. T have always felt different from 
Catholics elsewhere in Ireland and this is a common feeling among Ulster 
Catholics. Yet I have found them consistently neglected in the histories o f 
Ireland... ’6 Cavan too has been consistently neglected in the histories o f Ireland. 
This thesis will redress this matter.
There is a rich supply o f primary sources for this study. The Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC), the centrally controlled British police force in Ireland at the 
time, have left an enormous amount o f information for the scholar, in the form of 
intelligence reports and Confidential Monthly County Inspector Reports. For the 
county of Cavan the confidential reports and intelligence gathering give accounts 
o f police actions, agrarian outrages, secret societies, sectarian conflicts, political 
gatherings, Ulster Volunteer Force and National Volunteer Force activity and 
strength and a host o f other information on other organizations in the county.
The files create, through the eyes o f the RIC, an image o f Cavan as it was during 
this turbulent period. This information, which was initially gathered for the 
administration o f the country, was at the inception o f the Irish Free State 
removed to Britain because of its sensitive nature. It was stored in the British 
Colonial Office. Some o f the files were maintained up to 1926 showing the 
continuing importance of Ireland for the British administration, These files have 
been extracted from the Colonial Office files and reconstituted in one single 
body as the The British in Ireland; series one, They are one o f the most 
important primary sources for the study o f  Ireland's dual revolutions. They are
5 Marianne E lliott, T he C atholics o f  U lster (London, 20 0 0 )
6 i b i d  pxxxiii
7 British in Ireland Series one, Public R ecord O ffice, L ondon (D ublin C astle records) C olonial O ffice  class 
CO 904  hereinafter abbreviated to  PRO, CO 904
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available on microfilm in the University library o f the National University of 
Ireland, Maynooth.
The Famham Papers from the Famham Estate outside Cavan town provide 
a valuable window to the Unionist and loyalist past of Cavan from the 1880s 
right up to the 1920s. The Famhams were to the fore in leading the Ulster 
movement in Cavan. Lord Famham (Arthur Kenlis Maxwell eleventh Baron 
Famham) was chairman of the Irish Unionist Alliance, sat on the Ulster Unionist 
Council during the period covered by this study, and was one o f the most 
important figures in the organization o f the UVF in the county. The papers 
contain correspondence on all areas relating to the Unionist movement in Cavan 
to other local leaders and to other Ulster leaders. There are details o f UVF 
drilling and strength and o f other Protestant and loyalist organizations in the 
county such as The Royal Black Preceptorary and The Orange Order. They also 
contain the many newspaper cuttings Lord Famham collected from newspapers 
in Great Britain and Ireland relating to the Cavan Ulster Volunteers. The 
Famham Papers, many o f which have just come to light in recent months, can be 
consulted in the Public Record Office o f Northern Ireland.
The county newspaper the Anglo-Celt referred to locally by the nationalist 
population as simply the Celt. The paper by the period in question had come into 
Catholic proprietorship and had taken on a very nationalist outlook in its 
editorials. The disappearance some years earlier o f the Unionist orientated 
Cavan Weekly News saw the arrival o f Unionist orientated notices in the paper. 
The paper in fact reports on Unionist, nationalist and with the rise o f Sinn Fein 
republican meetings and rallies with a great degree of impartiality. The paper is 
an invaluable source for gauging organizational activity in the county from 1914 
to 1922.
This thesis is a study that will begin the work of redressing the fact that 
Cavan like other south Ulster counties during this important period has been 
repeatedly ignored for various reasons and agendas and as a result has to varying 
degrees deleted from existence in Irish histories. The thesis will develop the idea
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that Cavan played a peripheral yet pivotal position in Irish politics and the 
development o f the island as a whole.
The county o f Cavan in 1922 found itself with the reluctant acceptance o f 
the local Unionist population and with the fulfilment o f local nationalist 
aspirations, in a new state. Cavan however brought baggage. It was cut off 
economically from its economic hinterland in Ulster. A sizable Unionist 
minority also were cut off from what they saw as their cultural and religious 
brethren in the newly formed Northern Ireland. For many Cavan nationalists 
there was also a feeling they were cut off from and abandoning their fellow 
Ulster nationalists.
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C h a p te r  I
H om e Rule 
A Crisis In  Cavan
The Ulster Question, as it had generally become known in the early 
part o f the twentieth century, to British and Irish parliamentarians was 
not a recent development. A solution however was not forthcoming. 
Ulster had become the Medusa o f Irish and British politics alike. The 
treatment o f Ulster flared up emotions on all sides and political careers 
and the stability of governments were made and shattered there. 
Conditions in this province threatened to spark off a civil war that 
could envelope not only Ireland but also its sister island. Ulster had 
created a modem constitutional crisis and issues of allegiance, loyalty, 
and nationality were threatening to unravel the whole Union. The 
Parliamentary Act o f 1911, the final passing o f Home Rule onto the 
statute books, was an act o f treason from the standpoint o f Protestants 
of Ulster. They felt abandoned and betrayed. Already they had the 
embryonic stages o f a political movement across the province. Cavan 
was no different. The organisations and clubs such as the Loyal 
Orange Order, the Royal Black Preceptory and Unionist Clubs, active 
at local levels within the county, began the work of resistance. 
Nationalists too had their own exclusive organisations the Ancient 
Order of Hibernians (AOH), Sinn Fein clubs, the United Irish League 
(UIL), Conradh na Gaeilge, and the Gaelic Athletic Association 
(GAA). In Cavan these groups would unite to face down the threat to 
Home Rule.
Between the years 1912 and 1914 the entire province of Ulster 
exploded into political and sectarian turmoil. The county o f Cavan
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was caught up in and enveloped by this already long running episode. 
Forces and occurrences from without reacted with the nascent yet very 
real sectarian and political divisions within the county. The Unionists 
of Cavan were an integral part o f the wider movement within the 
province. The Protestants o f the county along with their fellow co­
religionists across the province o f Ulster rallied against the threat o f 
Home Rule and their fears of nationalist and Catholic domination. The 
Catholics and nationalists o f Ulster and especially Cavan counter 
reacted to this development and the politicking that ensued 
precipitated the so-called Ulster Crisis, the effects o f which were 
clearly visible in Cavan. This chapter will concern itself with the 
unfolding of the so-called ‘crisis’ in Cavan. It will display the 
mechanics o f Unionist and nationalist activities at a local level during 
this time, tracing their development and divergence from the wider 
movements, from which they had sprung. It will throw light on 
Unionist actions in the county and the later subsequent nationalist 
counter reaction.
The Ulster Unionists threatened to take arms up against the 
crown to defend the crown and set up a provisional government for the 
province if Home Rule was enacted for Ireland. The ideology o f 
Unionism was clear on this, any monarch, government, or political 
grouping that tampered with the Union or threatened to change 
Ireland’s constitutional status, within that Union, in any way they 
viewed as detrimental, in doing so surrendered any right they may 
have had to their loyalty. When such sentiments as this emerged 
among the Protestant population o f the province, and were espoused 
by their political leaders, many merely saw them as scare tactics by a 
desperate minority now virtually impotent since the removal o f the 
House of Lords veto.
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It was undeniable that three counties of Ulster, Monaghan,
Cavan and Donegal had large nationalist majorities, and 
two others Fermanagh and Tyrone, had very slight 
nationalist majorities. At most the Unionists predominated 
only in the four counties of Antrim, Down, Londonderry 
and Armagh... at Westminster the Unionists had a 
majority of only one... This position was actually 
reversed when a Home Ruler was returned in a by- 
election in the city of Londonderry early in 1913... Since 
the Unionists did not until a very late stage in the struggle, 
relinquish their demand for separate treatment of all nine 
counties of the historic province... Nevertheless, no one 
who understood the real nature of the Ulster situation 
would have been so deluded...1
Looking retrospectively at the facts behind Stewart’s observation one 
can definitely see the precarious position of the Ulster Protestants. He 
also throws light on a very obvious fact, one that this dissertation will 
further emphasise, that Protestants were only barely a majority in 
Ulster, a small minority on the island, and in Cavan they commanded 
less than 20% of the counties population.
Figure 1
Political Afilliations in the County of Cavan
1911
19%
■  Population for 
Free State
m Population for Belfast 
Parliament
A Pie chart representing the political affiliations in the County of Cavan in 
1911. Source: Adapted from data in Kevin O’Shiel, Handbook of the Ulster 
Question (Dublin, 1923) p66
1 A .T.Q . Stewart, The U lster Crisis (London, 1967) p49
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This was the smallest proportion of all the Ulster counties, yet it did 
not make these south Ulster Unionists any less vocal or active. 
However it is not surprising therefore that in this county where 
Unionism was very clearly present but not dominant that it would 
develop and react in quite a different way to the north-eastern 
heartland of the movement. The table below displays data extracted 
from an Irish government publication in 1923, from figures compiled 
by the Registrar General, for the year 1911.
Table 1
Total 
Population  
o f  Cavan
Population  
for 
Free State
Population for 
B elfast 
Parliament
91,173 74,261 16,912
Population of Cavan in 1911 showing political affiliations. Source: Adapted 
from data in Kevin O’Shiel, Handbook of the Ulster Question (Dublin, 1923)
p66
The table shows the demographic division and political wishes of 
Unionists and nationalists for the future of the county. Although this 
book applies the terminology of the early 1920s, the data can be seen 
to represent those in favour of Home Rule i.e. in favour of the Free 
State and the latter for a provisional government in Belfast if Home 
Rule was enacted.
The Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), were on the ground to 
witness the events of these two years in Cavan. The County Inspector 
provided monthly intelligence reports to the Dublin administration on 
the growth and development of both the Unionist and nationalist 
volunteer camps. From the start the communications underestimated 
the resolve at least in their reports, but accurately gauged the support 
for both the Unionist and nationalist movements in Cavan. It is 
possible also as this dissertation will go on to show that the RIC 
harboured a sympathy for the Ulster Volunteer movement in Cavan
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reflected in the tone of the reports to the castle. The economy of 
county Cavan was essentially an agriculturally based one in 1912 and 
most of the population lived rurally. Farming was almost at 
subsistence level and extremely labour intensive. For that reason UVF 
activity and subsequently Irish Volunteer activity was limited. In May 
and June of 1913 there was a falling off in attendance and a reduction 
in drilling according to police intelligence. The police accounted for
r\
this ‘due to this being the farmers busy time of year. ’ For many 
Unionists it seemed the survival of their crops and livelihood was 
more important than the survival of their political cause.
Nationalists in 1912 believed that they were nearing the end of 
a long struggle, and it was clearly manifested than in their popular 
culture through song. ‘Ireland long a province been a nation once 
again ’ these are the lyrics to a popular song of the time. Nationalists 
throughout Ireland greeted the passing of Home Rule with enthusiasm, 
and Cavan was no exception. The Unionists of the county, as the 
police reports show, were only beginning to prepare for their struggle 
to prevent Home Rule. In 1912 Unionists across Ulster and the British 
Empire signed the ‘Ulster Solemn League and Covenant’. Thousands 
of Unionists across Cavan also signed. It was an act of solidarity. The 
demography and interdependence economically meant many Unionists 
held back from signing the Covenant, but while they did not sign, their 
dedication to the cause did not go unreported. The County Inspector 
reported ‘business men and trades men while active in the movement 
abstained from signing.’3 By 1913 it had turned into much more. The 
County Inspectors report for February noted ‘A large meeting will be 
held in the Protestant hall Cavan town on the 19th by the various 
Unionist clubs to enrol members in the proposed Volunteer force. No
2 British in Ireland: series one, C avan C ounty Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, 
M ay 1913, PRO , CO 904 /90
3 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, A ugust 1913, PRO, CO 9 0 /90
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trouble is anticipated probably from 1,000 to 1,500 will attend.’4 In 
March the County Inspectors report noted that nationalist political 
societies were quiet while Unionist clubs and Orange Lodges were 
active. The Unionists of Cavan were stepping up their activities. ‘The 
Unionists held two large demonstrations during the month one at 
Derrylane and the other at Cavan, the object being to further protest 
against Home Rule, and to express their determination to resist it.’5 
The Unionists of Cavan had begun to flex their political muscles and 
in turn with the rest of their compatriots across Ulster took it to the 
next stage, the threat of military resistance.
Lord Famham of the Famham estate located outside Cavan 
town stepped into his role as the natural leader of the Unionists of 
Cavan. He organised them at home and defended them in the House of 
Lords at Westminster. In the House of Lords he led some scathing and 
often sectarian debates on the Catholics of Ireland and Home Rule.
The Daily Chronicle a London newspaper reported
Another Peer, Lord Famham in a very blatant utterance 
indulged in violent talk about armed resistance. ‘I hope 
many of your Lordships will come over and help us’ He 
effusively thanked Lord Willoughby de Broke, who had 
organised a British League for the defence of Ulster, and 
who in last nights debate used language of menace. Such 
incitements as these noble Lords indulged in yesterday and 
today have never been heard before in a legislative 
assembly.6
Earlier in the year, in that same house, he had championed the 
Protestant cause, and expounded the fears of his people of Roman 
Catholic control.
Perhaps it is difficult for the people of this country to 
understand why we Protestants in Ireland dread so much
4 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, February 1913, PRO, CO 904 /89
5 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, M arch 1913, PRO, CO 9 0 4 /89
6 D a i l y  C h r o n i c l e , 16 July 1913 in Farnham Papers P R O N ID /3975 /E /1 /7
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being placed under a Parliament which is essentially a 
Roman Catholic one... Individually, Roman Catholics and 
Protestants in Ireland can live peaceably and contentedly 
side by side, and they do so, and they are the best of 
friends, but only so long as they are ruled by a firm 
Government under an Imperial Parliament by Protestants, 
and I firmly believe many Roman Catholics dread the idea 
of the Church of Rome getting control of secular affairs.7
Lord Famham threw all his energies into the movement and it did not 
go without notice. It was quite clear in his own home county of Cavan, 
that Roman Catholics did not hold his political beliefs. It was also 
quite evident that the people he represented did not live contentedly 
side by side with their Catholic neighbours. It is arguable from 
examining the language of these speeches and many others that 
Famham was trying to draw on the sectarian elements within the 
British establishment, and as many of his speeches made the press he 
could hope to stir up Protestant opinion in his home county of Cavan. 
Events as they unfolded in the county would show this. New Unionist 
clubs were being formed across the county, in September 1913 one 
was formed in Cootehill, and that same month there was a break-in at 
a Hibernian hall.’8
The UVF, as the Ulster Volunteers were now known, were 
being drilled and armed with increasing regularity throughout 1913. 
They were however impeded at their foundation by a shortage of 
military equipment. Lord Famham became at least on paper, if the 
police reports intelligence are accurate, the main, but not sole importer 
of arms and ammunition into the county. He was not alone; the 
majority of the Cavan nobility played a role in the movement. A look 
at the intelligence gathered by the police in July 1913 listing the 
organisers of the UVF in Cavan, ‘Lord Famham of Famham, Colonel 
The Right Honourable H. Maxwell of Mount Nugent, Captain S.
7 Parliamentary D ebates, January 28 , 1913 in Farnham Papers P R O N ID /3975 /E /1 /4
8 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, Septem ber 1913, PRO , CO 904/91
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Saunderson of Castle Saunderson, Major Hamilton of Castle 
Hamilton, Captain M. Pratt of Kingscourt, Mr. William Matthews of 
Cavan, Rev. W.J. Askins of Kilmore and Rev. A.W Me Larvey of 
Drung.’9 It was illegal for the force to drill in public. This problem 
was circumvented by Famham, who put his demesne outside Cavan 
town at the disposal of the Ulster Volunteers. Cavan made the national 
press in June 1913 when the Irish Times reported that a consignment 
of arms had been seized in Dublin and impounded in the Custom 
House en-route from England. ‘The address of the consignee, “To 
Lord Famham, Famham, Co. Cavan, Ireland,” being written in large 
bold hand... A Cavan correspondent states that Lord Famham left 
Cavan on Saturday morning by motor car, and that his destination was 
supposed to be Dublin.’10 Famham was determined to make a 
formidable force out of the Cavan volunteers.
The RIC reported that in July 1913 the high point of the 
Protestant processional calendar a large public meeting took place in 
Famham Demesne outside Cavan and that approximately 9000 people 
attended, Lord Famham, Captain Saunderson of Castle Saunderson 
and Mr Butcher MP for York spoke. This was followed by a 
procession around Cavan town of 2,400 a similar rally was held in 
Bailieboro 2,500 people attending.11 By this point the Ulster 
Volunteers in Cavan had grown to 2,500 and according to police 
intelligence were drilling regularly. Their drill instructors were all ex
* 17soldiers and policemen. The County Inspector routinely played down 
the UVF as an organization, while noting their rapidly growing 
support and membership. ‘[The] UV Force as it exists in the county at 
present would be very troublesome if there was rioting in the county 
but as a force against disciplined troops it would not be taken seriously
9 County Inspector’s Confidential M onth ly  Report, July 1913, PRO , CO 9 0 4 /90
10 I r i s h  T im e s ,  9  June 1913
11 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, July 1913, PRO, CO 904 /90
12 i b i d
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into account.’ He furthers this by offering his superiors his opinion 
for the existence of the force. ‘I feel sure the county leaders hold the 
same opinion so I am driven to the conclusion that the force exists for 
the purpose of endeavouring to persuade the democracy of this 
Kingdom of the seriousness of the position in Ireland so that public 
opinion may bring about a general election on the Irish question 
before the Home Rule bill becomes law’14 It is possible he actually 
believed what he was saying and possibly in its infancy the UVF were 
simply nothing more than political weights. The language of the 
County Inspector betrays his sympathies towards the movement 
however. Lord Famham’s speeches and actions however go far to 
disprove this view of the Ulster Volunteers of being anything less than 
an army in formation. Like any military operation in the beginning the 
deficiencies and weaknesses of the Cavan UVF were clearly visible, 
after a year of drilling this began to change.
The nationalists of Cavan observed the actions of the Cavan 
Unionists and their high profile leader Lord Famham. Cavan did not 
escape the rising wave of sectarianism sweeping the province and the 
importation of arms and the frequent drilling of the Ulster Volunteers 
had created bitterness among the Catholic population. The nationalist 
backlash was directed at the movements’ leader in the county.
Lord Famham reported at 3.30pm on Saturday that as he and Mr J.
F. burrows were returning from Derm, in the sub-district of 
Crosskeys, District of Virginia, at about 8.30pm on 31st of 
December, where a drill of Volunteers had been held, a barbed wire 
was placed across the public road at a height of about 3 1/2 feet from 
the ground, that the motor car in which they were travelling was 
stopped before they got as far as where the wire was placed.15
11
13 ibid
14 ibid
15 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, January 1914, PRO , CO 904 /92
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Lord Famham made a lucky escape from this rather crude 
assassination attempt and in many ways it fuelled fire on both sides. 
For the Unionists it manifested all their worst fears about nationalists 
and for the nationalists it may have led to the realization from this 
failed attempt that they should come together and form their own 
volunteer corp. Sectarian tension was again manifest in the county 
when in what the police termed party feeling a Doctor O’Rourke was 
evicted. ‘His Landlord is a Unionist the Doctor is a nationalist.’16 For 
the RIC it had become that black and white, the county of Cavan had 
split, into two adversarial and polarized political camps
Unionist activity continued unabated in the county as 1914 
progressed and if anything gathered momentum. The drilling and 
training of the UVF became more intensive and professional. This was 
marked by an increased dedication by the Cavan Ulster Volunteers. 
The actions of Cavan unionists were highly publicised. The Dublin 
Express reported that a ‘camp of instruction’ for 230 selected men had 
taken place on the Demesne of Lord Famham. ‘The majority of the 
men are farmers and farmers sons, and the fact of their leaving their 
farms at this busy season for a weeks drills under rigorous discipline 
affords ample proof of the earnestness of the Unionists of Co. 
Cavan.’17 Again in May another camp took place. ‘The volunteers 
attending the camp will be picked men, to the number of 110, who 
have been nominated as likely to become efficient as non 
commissioned officers.’18 As a military force in Cavan the UVF, could 
no longer be taken lightly, by the civil authorities. They were trained 
and disciplined, and were increasingly becoming better armed. The 
Volunteers of Cavan received a huge moral boost with the so-called 
‘Curragh mutiny’. The RIC report to Dublin for the month of April 
noted that the ‘Unionists and the Ulster Volunteers are jubilant over
16 County Inspector’s Confidential Monthly Report, February 1914, PRO, CO 904/92
17 Dublin Express, 14 March 1914 in Famham Papers, PRONID3975/E/1/7
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the actions of the mutinous officers at the Curragh, whilst the 
nationalists refer to them as rebels.’19
Illustration 1.1
‘Lord Farnham teaches the Orangemen of Cavan how to shoot/
Source: Illustrated Chronicle. Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 14 March 1914 in 
Farnham Papers, PRONID3975/E/1/
The nationalist response to the Unionist threat had been slow. It 
took the form of unorganised random attacks and bitter inter 
communal relations or what the RIC referred to as party tension. The 
nationalists of the county were again further embittered towards the 
UVF by the Lame gun running incident. The Ulster Volunteers began 
to be taken more seriously. They now posed a very real threat to what 
the nationalists of the county had for so long aspired. By March 1914 
the nationalist newspaper in the county The Anglo-Celt in its editorials 
was calling for the setting up of a nationalist volunteer corp. The call 
was answered and between April and May there was a rush of
18 Irish Times, 7 May 1914
19 County Inspector’s Confidential Monthly Report, April 1914, PRO, CO 904/93
18
nationalist activity in the county. In April the confidential report for
the county stated that ‘six branches of the Irish National Volunteers
20have been formed and others are in the course of formation. ’ By 
May the force numbered 2,000 men and companies were still being 
formed. ‘Most of the members are armed with revolvers and shotguns 
-  The drill instructors are ex-soldiers and ex-militia men. ’ Cavan 
was now divided into two opposing armed camps. All shades of Irish 
nationalism came together in the face of the new threat. ‘The Ulster 
Volunteers are on one side and the Sinn Feiners, Members of the 
AOH, And members of the UIL now merged in the National 
Volunteer Corp were very active during the month drilling etc.’22
The following months saw the two organizations grow rapidly 
in size and strength. Cavan was now in real danger of being subsumed 
in civil war. In May the Cavan UVF had risen in number to 3,000 men 
and by July this figure had gone up to 3461. The Home Rule bill had 
been passed through the House of Commons for the third time in May 
1914. This was too much for the Unionists and on the 10 July 1914 the 
Ulster provisional government convened in Belfast. On the ground, 
the ranks of both volunteer movements swelled, leading to an 
escalation in an already terse situation. As both movements very 
clearly geared up for confrontation, events in the wider world would 
once again overtake, overshadow and to a degree diffuse the situation 
in Cavan. On the 4 August 1914 Great Britain and Ireland declared 
war on Germany. In Cavan all had changed and yet nothing had 
changed. The political landscape had been altered completely. On one 
side Unionist opinion had been driven to the extreme, and on the 
other, all shades of nationalism had united to counter the threat that 
this new militant Unionism posed. The threat of the gun had entered
20 County Inspector’s Confidential Monthly Report, April 1914, PRO, CO 904/93
21 County Inspector’s Confidential Monthly Report, May 1914, PRO, CO 904/93
22 ibid
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the politics o f Cavan. Neither Unionists nor nationalists had achieved 
their desired objectives. Their leaders for the moment put away their 
differences for the greater good. Civil war had been averted, but the 
extremity of the situation had placed Cavan on a new uncertain 
political course. Militant nationalism had been unleashed. Militant 
Unionism, better armed and drilled was still dwarfed in comparison in 
the county. This however was not reflected in the province as a whole 
where the combined UVF stood at 85,000 men.24 The UVF o f Cavan 
could afford themselves a great deal o f quiet confidence with this in 
mind.
23 County Inspector’s C onfidential M onth ly  Report, June 1914  and A ugust 1914, PRO , CO  
904/93  and PRO , CO 904 /94
24 D avid  Fitzpatrick, T he tw o  Irelands 1912-1939  (O xford, 1998) p46
reach of the Zeppelins, the farms, mills, workshops and shipyards o f Ulster strove 
to meet the insatiable demands o f the war effort. Never had the island been so 
prosperous and rarely had the island known such domestic peace.’ Both the 
nationalist and Unionist leaders o f Cavan joined in their support for the war effort. 
‘The County Cavan War Relief Fund was set up in response to the Prince o f Wales 
appeal, by Lord Famham, Thomas Lough, MP, and Mr J. Maxwell Greene... 
initially, lists o f subscribers included most o f the gentry in the county, but was also 
supported by nationalist leaders. ’3 The County Inspector wrote in the September 
report to Dublin castle. ‘There is not the slightest sympathy for the Germans,
(Save the actions o f the Ballinagh Sinn Feiners in posting up anti enlisting notices) 
so far as can be observed or ascertained, all sections are working together to raise 
funds for the dependants o f soldiers and sailors engaged in the war. ’4 Although the 
sentiments o f the population were decidedly anti German and generally supportive 
of the war effort, they were not as eager as their leaders to go into battle.
(Every section of the public -  save the despicable Sinn 
Feiners -  are inclined to back up the government in 
connection with the war.) The Sinn Feiners have 
distributed anti enlistment leaflets, which have had a 
considerable effect in keeping young men from joining the 
army.5
The tone of the County Inspectors report clearly indicated an antipathy towards 
Sinn Fein and also they were having in his opinion a very subversive effect on the 
population. Sinn Fein tactics were given fuel to take root among the population of 
the county and the police report went on to note. ‘About 150 young men left for 
America during last month in consequence o f  the announcement in the Irish Daily 
Independent newspaper that the government were going to put the militia ballot 
act in force.’6 The men o f Cavan regardless o f political persuasion and loyalties
2 Jonathan Bardon, A history o f  U lster (B elfast, 1992) p451
3 E ileen  R eilly , ‘Cavan in the era o f  the Great War, 19 1 4 -1 8 ’ in Cavan: essavs on  the history o f  an Irish 
county Ray G illesp ie ed  (Dublin, 1995) p l8 3
1 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, Septem ber 1914, PRO , CO 904 /94
5 County Inspector’s C onfidential M onthly Report, O ctober, 1914, PRO , CO 904 /95
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were not joining up to fight. The Inspector noted that since the war had begun 238 
reservists from the county had been called up, 153 were members of the Irish 
National Volunteers (INV), 55 were members of the Ulster Volunteers and the 
remaining 30 were those whose politics were not ascertainable.7 Only 210 men 
had actually joined the army in Cavan as new recruits 47 were members of the 
INV, 76 were members of the UVF and the remaining 87 had unknown political 
affiliations.8 As the months went on the numbers of men enlisting dwindled from 
this meagre number to almost non-existence. The police reports for the duration of 
the war record this decline and general lack of enthusiasm to go to the front. This 
was in marked contrast to the province and Ireland as a whole where military 
mobilisation was the highest in the country’s history.
... even more Irish Volunteers than Ulster Volunteers 
served during the war. The police reported the enlistment 
of 32,000 Irish Volunteers, including 7,600 reservists 
mobilized in August 1914. Although this represented only 
a sixth of peak membership compared with over a third for 
the Ulster Volunteers, the discrepancy was partly 
accountable for the greater participation of juveniles and 
older men in the nationalist force. Irelands volunteer 
forces thus contributed massively to wartime military 
mobilization, which altogether involved the raising of over 
200,000 men in Ireland (of whom about three fifths were 
Catholics).9
Cavan went against the grain nationally with its especially low levels of 
recruitment. The war would therefore seem to have generated more reasons to stay 
at home than enlist. Cavan had an agricultural economy and at a time when 
agricultural prices were rising due to the war demands, it made a lot more sense to 
stay at home. The County Inspector reported for the month of October 1914. 
‘There has been a plentiful harvest, and the crops have been well saved.’10
7 The Irish V olunteer Force had split w h en  R edm ond called  on  them  to  jo in  the w ar effort. T he majority o f  
the force 170,000 renamed the Irish N ational V olunteers or IN V  fo llow ed  R edm ond, w h ile  the rem aining  
splinter group o f  around 11,000 under M ac N eill retained the title Irish V olunteer Force
8 Jonathan Bardon, A  history o f  U lster (B elfast, 1992) p 450  & County Inspector’s C onfidential M onthly  
Report, October, 1914, PR O  CO 904 /95
9 D avid Fitzpatrick, The T w o Irelands (Oxford, 1998) p54
10 County Inspector’s C onfidential M onthly Report, O ctober, 1914, PRO, CO 904/95
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Agricultural prices increased with the demands generated by the war. The young 
men of the county were needed at home, and not off at the front. ‘J.M. Wilson 
(brother o f Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson and a Longford land owner) who did 
a  tour of Ulster at this time argued that the failure o f the Protestant farming class 
to respond to the full measure o f its obligations throughout the province was 
largely to be accounted for by ‘a natural dislike to leave their homes unprotected 
as long as their Nationalist neighbours abstain from recruiting’11 Whatever the 
reasons recruitment was a non-starter in Cavan and both Unionists and nationalists 
stayed at home from the front. Between January and March o f 1914 the police 
reports noted ‘All efforts to get the farmers’ sons to come in have been fruitless... 
Recruiting for the Army has been very bad... the farmers sons still holding 
back...,12 The leadership o f both nationalist and Unionist movements were clearly 
out o f touch with their constituents in Cavan.
As the months rolled on the anti-recruiters stepped up their actions in the 
county, meeting with varying degrees o f success. The County Inspector wrote 
incessantly to the Dublin administration in his monthly reports about the lack of 
recruitment, and the many reasons he believed were responsible.
It is believed that if  troops were stationed here, especially 
with a band, and moved about the county, it would give 
great stimulation to recruiting... Recruiting is at a stand 
still and was greatly hindered by the interference of a pro- 
German called McTab at a public recruiting meeting...
Recruiting for H.M. Army does not appear to be so brisk 
in this county as elsewhere, and there are plenty of able- 
bodied young fellows who have not joined... 1
Efforts continued throughout 1915 to get the young men o f Cavan to enlist, but 
met with little success. The Anglo-Celt from the autumn o f 1915 into the spring o f 
1916, reported on the many reorganised local nationalist groups such as the UIL 
who actively encouraged recruitment. The fact o f their existence shows that on 
some levels there was a continued support among some sections o f the nationalists
11 Terence Dooley, The plight o f Monaghan Protestants. 1912-1926 (Dublin, 2000) p31
12 County Inspector’s Confidential Monthly Report, January to March 1916, PRO, CO 904/99
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toward the war. Their effect among the general population of the county was also 
nominal, as the police reports have clearly demonstrated. The insurrection later in 
1916 to a great extent undermined any if all the work they had done.
When at Easter 1916 news reached Cavan o f the failed rebellion in Dublin 
there was a definite mixed reaction among the nationalist population. At the end of 
the year the County Inspectors around the country received a précis from the RIC 
Dublin headquarters requesting them to detail the condition o f their county for the 
year 1916. They were asked to report on a range of subjects, crime, Irish 
Volunteer and Sinn Féin activity, the attitudes of Catholic clergy and nationalist 
press and the present attitudes o f the people towards the Army and Home Rule.
The County Inspector for Cavan returned a detailed report to Dublin, which 
throws light on the divisions that were beginning to grow among the nationalist 
ranks o f the county. The Inspector reported that the condition o f the county for 
1916 had been ‘peaceable and orderly... boycotting and intimidation are not 
practiced’14 As regards political organisations he wrote ‘political societies were 
not as a rule active. The Sinn Féin, GAA and the Irish Volunteers exercised the 
most influence in the early part o f the year’15 Prior to the rebellion he informed his 
superiors ‘[The] Sinn Féin party showed a good deal o f activity due to the efforts 
o f IV [Irish Volunteer] organisers James O ’ Sullivan and Alfred Monaghan.’16 The 
police report does not indicate any direct Cavan involvement in the rebellion. The 
language and tone o f the report clearly intimated towards the County Inspectors 
belief however the Cavan members o f Sinn Féin and the Irish Volunteers were 
aware that a rising would take place even if  they were not actively engaged in it. 
The Inspector informed that both Roman Catholic clergy and the nationalist press 
were in general neutral. He did single out one Father M. Dolan from Saint 
Patrick’s College, Cavan town who preaching in the ‘Convent Chapel asked the 
congregation to pray for the Cavan men who died for their country in Dublin, and
13 County Inspector’s Confidential Monthly Report, February to May 1915, PRO, CO 904/96 and PRO, CO
904/97
14 County Inspector’s Confidential Monthly Report, January 1917, PRO, CO 904/102
15 Ibid
16 Ibid
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said that any man who does not sympathise with the rebels was not worthy o f the 
name Irishman.’17 The voice o f dissent was rising in Cavan.
The Easter Rising o f 1916 had a major effect on Cavan. Increasingly 
interests were shifting in the county away from the war, people were progressively 
more interested with the rebellion and the governments reaction to it. ‘By the end 
of May, however, he [the editor o f the Anglo-Celt] noted changes in feelings, the 
rebels now being described in milder terms as ‘misguided’. Ten arrests had been 
made in the county following searches... resulting in deportations to prison 
camps.’18 Raids in a county, that had not risen in rebellion provoked a reaction in 
nationalist ranks. Other major domestic concerns increasingly turned attentions in 
Cavan away from the front. Home Rule seemed as far off as ever now and 
Gladstone’s plan to partition Ulster in an Irish settlement was received with mixed 
feelings. Redmond had agreed in principal, to a temporary exclusion o f the six 
northeastern counties o f Ulster. ‘When Redmond canvassed the views o f the 
bishops from the northern province whose dioceses lay within the proposed new 
state in June, they let him know they were opposed to partition on any basis.’19 
Cavan was not immune to the agreement. A large section o f Cavan was part o f 
diocese of Kilmore so too was part o f Fermanagh the proposed settlement would 
therefore partition the bishopric. The ugly head o f conscription would not go away 
either and the threat of its’ enforcement still hung over Ireland. In 1918 
conscription was extended to Ireland. A ‘public protest meeting’ reported in the 
Anglo-Celt newspaper in April 1918 shows another reason for low Protestant 
recruitment, quite the opposite situation to W ilson’s observations on their attitudes 
towards the war effort. Present at the meeting were all the major nationalist 
groupings in the county the UIL, GAA, Sinn Fein, the AOH also on the platform 
were representatives o f the Catholic clergy. ‘The most commendable unanimity 
prevailed, and the spirit o f brotherhood in the face of a common danger was very 
marked. All the Nationalist traders and a few o f the Unionists closed their
17 Ibid
18 Eileen Reilly, ‘Cavan in the era of the Great War, 1914-18’ in Cavan; essavs on the history of an Irish 
county Ray Gillespie ed (Dublin, 1995) pl90
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premises to enable the assistants to attend the meeting. A number o f Unionists 
were also present.’20 Many Protestants in Cavan this shows were prepared to 
break ranks and join with their Catholic neighbours in a sense o f threat they 
seemingly shared. The Irish Party and its leader Redmond came to be seen 
increasingly as weak and ineffectual. In the run up to a  general election this was 
the boost that Sinn Fein needed and the disillusioned nationalist masses o f Cavan 
began to flock to the party. A look a the table below which was included in the 
County Inspectors reports for January illustrates the fragmented nature of 
nationalism in Cavan and the growth Sinn Fein as an alternative route for 
achieving Irish national aspirations. This was a trend that was going to continue in 
the county.
Table 2
Name of Society
Wo of such
Membership Remarkssocieties
1Sinn Fein Clubs 57 2927 -
2 A.O.H. (Board of Erin) 43 3155 -
3 United 1. League 42 5959 -
ATown Tenants League 5 446 -
S G.A. association 21 943 -
6 Gaelic League 6 143 -
7 Evicted T. association 1 27 -
8 Unionist Clubs 27 2499 -
9 Irish Nat. Volunteers 42 3073 -
10 Irish Volunteers 6 177 -
11 Irish Nat. Foresters 3 178 -
12 Labour League 3 105 -
13 Ulster Vol. Force 38 2498 -
14Cumm-na-mBhan 4 118 -
‘List of Political associaitions on 31 January 1918’ Source: County
Confidential Monthly Report, February 1918, P.R.O., CO 904/105
The year 1918 was the beginning of a political revolution in County Cavan. 
The county took centre stage in the battle between the Irish Parliamentary Party 
and Sinn Fein. The Anglo-Celt reported the opening volleys of the campaign on
19 Father Dan Gallogly, ‘Patrick Finnegan and the birth of the Irish Free State 1900 to 1923’ in Breifiie: 
Journal of Cumann Seanchais Bhreifne. viii no. 1, (1989-1990) p648
20 Anglo-Celt 20 April 1918
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the 1 January in the aptly named headline ‘Sinn Fein in Co. Cavan demonstration 
at Belturbet.’21 All the speakers carried a similar line Sinn Fein was now the 
peoples only option. ‘The Chair was taken by Dr. J. Stuart, who, in a brief address 
in Irish, welcomed the contingents to Belturbet for the opening of the Sinn Fein 
Campaign. Sinn Fein he said was the only straight path to Irish independence.’22 In 
a letter read from the very reverend P. O’Connell of Cootehill mention was made 
of the upcoming election. ‘As we know that the Irish Party and other parties who 
stand for English domination in our land will be well supplied with funds out of 
the British Treasury. ’ Sinn Fein brought to the county the high profile vice- 
president of the party Arthur Griffith who also spoke at the meeting. Griffith 
introduced to the crowd as ‘the father of Sinn Fein’ was informed that pride was 
taken from the fact that ‘his ancestors belonged to Co. Cavan.’24 In his speech 
Griffith informed the people ‘Sinn Fein is Ireland and Ireland is Sinn Fein... They 
were opening a year that would be a fateful one in Irish history.’25 In the West 
Knockbride branch of the UIL different sentiments were expressed
We unanimously welcome the recent weighty 
pronouncement of his Eminence Cardinal Logue against 
Sinn Fein, in which he declared that the establishment of 
an Irish Republic by force of arms, a dream which no man 
in his sober senses can hope to be realised, and as the head 
of the Catholic Church in Ireland we are bound to follow 
him in obedience, who was ever the faithful and fearless of 
Catholicity in this land.26
Arthur Griffith was right they were opening a year that would be fateful in Irish 
history and decisive in the history of County Cavan. The nationalist population of 
the county were now being forced to choose which side they would take. The Irish 
Party had failed to deliver Home Rule and was at odds with the Catholic Church 
over partition. The party seemed unable to prevent the implementation of
21 Anglo-Celt 5 January 1918
22 Ibid
23 Ibid
24 Ibid
25 Ibid
26 Ibid
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conscription. Sinn Fein was their only alternative yet the Catholic Church had also 
branded their objectives ‘a dream’.
The death in April 1918 of Samuel Young, MP, for East Cavan and the 
subsequent by-election began the contest between the two parties for the control of 
the county. It was to be the last election fought in Ireland before the general 
election of that same year and Cavan took centre stage in the struggle between the 
two parties for the hearts and minds of nationalist Ireland. The two parties threw 
all their energies into the election campaign. The Anglo-Celt on 20 April 1918 
reported a Sinn Fein meeting in Virginia with an estimated 20,000 people taking 
part.27 Sinn Fein fought their campaign in Cavan on the Irish Party’s failure to 
prevent conscription. The Chairman opened his address with a very strong 
nationalistic and emotive speech that was greeted the newspaper reported with 
‘loud applause’, indicating that the large crowd present were in agreement with his 
sentiments.
Fellow countrymen I thank you for the honour you have 
conferred on me to preside at this monster meeting. It is not 
a political meeting, but a meeting where men of all shades 
of political opinion are asked to join hands and help to 
ward off a terrible calamity that threatens our young men 
and old men too. An alien Government is trying to 
conscript Irishmen to save the British from their cousins, 
the Germans, a rather difficult task. This war was started 
without our consent and without consulting the people of 
this country, therefore we are in no way bound to carry it 
out.28
The East Cavan vacancy created what could almost be called a crisis in some of 
the political intelligentsia of the county. The Anglo-Celt carried the sentiments of 
many who viewed the idea of two opposing nationalist candidates running in the 
by-election as creating ‘turmoil and division which such a contest must produce.’29 
In a letter to the editor printed in that same issue one reader wrote ‘... as a native 
and voter in the constituency I earnestly appeal to the good sense and patriotism of
27 Anglo-Celt 20 April 1918
28 Ibid
29 Anglo-Celt 21 April 1918
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the electors to see that in view of the present grave menace which overhangs our 
country East Cavan will not endanger the national unity which now, thank God 
exists. Many letters also called on the parties to agree on a ‘common’ or 
‘independent’ candidate. On 30 April 1918 Dr Finegan the Roman Catholic bishop 
of Kilmore addressed a letter to the press appealing for unity in nationalist ranks.
There can be no doubt that an election contest in East 
Cavan will seriously endanger if not break up, the present 
national unity... I make earnest appeal to Mr. Dillon and 
Mr. de Valera, that for the sake of the union so necessary in 
the face of the coining crisis, that they make some 
compromise by which this deplorable contest may be 
avoided... Especially I appeal to the Nationalist members 
of East Cavan, both Sinn Fein and Parliamentarian... to 
send messages to their leaders... All this requires the 
sinking of personal and party views, but why not that for 
the sake of Ireland and of unity in the struggle before us?31
The appeals and protestations of these people did not carry any weight in 
the ranks of Sinn Fein. Eamonn de Valera at a meeting in County Roscommon 
was reported as saying it was up to the people of East Cavan to decide.32 Sinn 
Fein chose Arthur Griffith to run in the election. He had already been introduced 
to the electorate at rallies earlier in the year and as vice-president of Sinn Fein was 
a high profile candidate. His views and ideas were well known and his book The 
Resurrection o f  Hungary which expounded his ideas on the separation of Ireland 
from England. In response to the public outcry Irish Party waited almost two 
weeks before they followed Sinn Fein into the campaign. They chose Mr. John F. 
O’Hanlon editor of the Anglo-Celt as their candidate. He too was a well-known 
local figure and his nationalist politics were well known to the electorate who read 
his editorials. He offered to immediately stand down if Arthur Griffith did 
likewise ‘for the sake of unity’ The Irish Party opened their campaign in 
Bailieborough at which Mr Dillon leader of the Irish Party was present. Clearly the
30 Ibid
31 Anglo-Celt 4  M ay 1918
32 Ibid
33 Ibid
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party did not want to be out done by Sinn Féin if this election was to come down 
to a high profile contest. The Anglo-Celt for the months of May and June 1918 
was dominated by the election campaign. Nationalist MPs and leading Sinn Féin 
figures flocked to East Cavan and each group held meetings right round the 
constituency. O’Hanlon challenged Sinn Féin to ‘stand down in favour of any 
neutral candidate.’34 Griffith’s response was to the point ‘there was no political 
truce and there could be none as long as there were men in Ireland who would not 
work for a complete and independent Irish nation.’35 The campaign continued with 
O’Hanlon responding ‘it could not be expected that a seat which the Irish party 
had held for forty-three years, and which had gave Joe Biggar to Ireland could be 
surrendered without a contest.’36 The election campaign began to gather 
importance nationally when Dillon stated ‘I have come here today to put fully and 
frankly before the electors of East Cavan, and the Nationalists of Ireland the 
position of the Irish National Party.’37 The position he stated was as before this 
contest threatened the ‘national unity’. The announcement that followed showed 
the importance that the party placed on this election. ‘That twenty members of the 
Irish Parliamentary party in addition to other speakers will be in the constituency 
next Sunday, and addresses will be delivered after mass at every Catholic church 
in East Cavan.’38 The Parliamentarians intended to fight and fight hard. The 
fighting strayed from the vocal when an attempt was made allegedly by ‘Sinn 
Féiners’ to break up a nationalist meeting in Virginia. ‘A few of the speakers were 
struck with mud and eggs, and on one occasion an attempt was made to rush the 
platform. This attack was beaten off by Mr O’Hanlon’s supporters and in the 
scuffles that ensued blows were freely exchanged.’39 The prophesised divisions 
were appearing in the nationalist ranks of East Cavan and the ‘national unity’ 
based on party lines no longer existed. The editorial of the Anglo-Celt the week 
before the election summed up the enormity situation.
i b i a
35 Ibid
36 Ibid
37 Ibid
38 Ibid
39 Anglo-Celt 18 M ay 1918
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Yesterday, in the Courthouse, Cootehill, Mr. John F.
O’Hanlon, the Nationalist candidate, and Mr. Arthur 
Griffith, Sinn Feiner, were nominated for the East Cavan 
Parliamentary constituency in the House of Commons, to 
which place Mr. Griffith has declared he will never go, if 
elected and before the next issue of the “Anglo-Celt” is 
printed the voters shall have declared, in the ballot-box, 
which of the policies submitted to them so definitely they 
believe in.40
The infighting and fighting among the nationalists of East Cavan continued right 
up to polling day on 20 June 1918. The result would be a defining moment in the 
politics of Cavan. Arthur Griffith won by a large majority taking 3,795 of the 
votes polled to O’Hanlon’s 2,581,41 The Irish Parliamentary Party and what it 
represented had been defeated in East Cavan.
The Irish Party lost its footing in the county as a result of the election. It 
never recovered. Sinn Fein ran unopposed in the general election of 1918 in 
Cavan’s two constituencies. Arthur Griffith was again returned for East Cavan and 
Peter Paul Galligan was elected for West Cavan. The people of Cavan had 
abandoned constitutionalism for the revolutionary idea of abstentionism preached 
by Sinn Fein. The Great War had ended one crisis in Cavan, but at its culmination 
it had created a new constitutional crisis far beyond what had ever been envisaged 
on a popular level. The nationalists of Cavan had chosen a new political route. 
They too shelved ‘Home Rule’ they now aimed for the greater prize of an Irish 
republic. The gulf between them and their Unionist neighbours naturally widened 
as a result. The political landscape had been changed dramatically.
40 Anglo-Celt 15 June 1918
41 Brian M. W alker ed Parliam entary results in Ireland 1801 -  1922 (Dublin, 1978)
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C hapter III 
C avan a future 
N orth  or South?
The general election of 1918 marked a watershed in Irish history. It radically 
transformed the political face of Ireland. The Great War, which had lasted four 
years, was finally over, and to those servicemen returning from the fighting 
they found a very different reality to the one that they had left. The Unionists of 
south Ulster returned to the realization that they had been abandoned by their 
brethren in the six northeastern counties, for a settlement based on partition.
The Irish National Volunteers who had enlisted also came home to a country 
where the Home Rule doctrine they had left to fight for was now obsolete, with 
nationalists now dedicating themselves to full independence. The course of the 
war had brought many changes in Irish public opinion. The war had steadily 
lost the support of both Unionists and nationalists in south Ulster and neither 
the Protestant nor Catholic inhabitants of this area enlisted in any great 
numbers. The majority if not all Irish nationalists had now shifted in their 
allegiances from constitutional nationalism to militant republicanism. In the 
election of 1918 a completely new political landscape emerged at national 
level. In Ulster, the redistribution of seats and enlarged franchise returned 
twenty-three Unionist MPs, and four of the six remaining Irish Parliamentary 
Party MPs were also from the province.1 Three of these seats actually won by 
the Parliamentarians were ‘partly as the result of a pact with Sinn Fein, 
arranged by Cardinal Logue, in constituencies where Unionists were certain to 
win, if there had been three way contests.’ Sinn Fein claimed the remainder of
1 Jonathan Bardon, A  history o f  U lster (Belfast, 1992) p462
2Logue, M ichael bom  1840 in Co. D onegal, ordained at M aynooth 1866, taught on  the continent, 
becam e Catholic bishop o f  R aphoe in 1879 and from  1887 until he died in 1924 he w as archbishop o f  
A rm agh and Catholic prim ate o f  all Ireland. ‘A  pragm atic prelate he w as anxious tha t neither dom estic
32
the seats in the province. The Irish Parliamentary Party now almost totally 
eclipsed, along with the Ulster Unionist Party and the Unionist MPs from 
Dublin University and County Dublin now constituted the only Irish 
representation in the House of Commons. Sinn Fein captured the remainder and 
majority of the nationalist seats in Ireland and initiated their revolutionary 
strategy for self-determination. Sinn Fein withdrew from Westminster under 
their policy of abstention and set up Dail Eireann. Over the next four years, 
from 1918 on, the forces shown to be at play in Ireland from 1912 would reach 
a dramatic conclusion, and by 1922 the constitutional status of Ireland would 
be completely altered.
Table 3
C o u n tv  o f  C a v an
L ist o f  P o litica l O rg an iza tio n s  on 30 Ju n e  1920
No Name Number of 
Branches
Number of 
Members
Remarks
1 Sinn Fein 64 4873 Secretly Active
2 AOH (BOE) 40 3851 Inactive
3 UIL 40 5585 Inactive
4 GAA 22 869 Inactive
5 Town Tenants League 9 446 Inactive
6 Gaelic League 20 926 Inactive
7 Evicted Tenants League 1 27 Inactive
8 Unionist Clubs 26 2478 Inactive
9 IN  Foresters 3 178 Inactive
10 IV. 12 519 Secretly active
11 I.N.V 40 2889 Inactive
12 Labour League 1 25 Inactive
13 U.V.F. 37 2468 Inactive
14 Cumann na Ban 12 343 Inactive
15 IT &GW Union 13 1029 Inactive
‘List of Political associations on 30 June 1920’ Source: County Inspector’s Confidential 
Monthly Report, July 1920, P.R.O., CO 904/112
The table above, which appeared in the County Inspectors report to Dublin 
Castle for July 1920, is interesting in a number of respects. It displays the still
politics nor Rom an directives should com prom ise the interests o f  the Irish C hurch..’ See S. J. Conolly 
ed The O xford Com panion to  Irish H istory (Oxford, 1998) p327 and Jonathan Bardon, A  history o f  
U lster (Belfast, 1992) p462
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fragmented nature of Cavan’s political landscape in 1920. The same groupings 
were all still extant as in the table shown for 1918, with the addition of some 
new labour groupings.3 The table also displays the massive growth in sectarian 
nationalist organisations such as the AOH, cultural nationalist groups like the 
GAA and the Gaelic League (Conradh na Gaeilge), which had almost doubled 
their membership. These groups as much as any other had a very political 
appeal in their drive for an Irish Ireland and were the fertile recruiting grounds 
for the more militant republican societies, like the Irish Volunteers and Sinn 
Fein. The table also demonstrates the phenomenal growth Sinn Fein had 
experienced and yet the United Irish League (UIL), which had developed over 
time into the Irish Parliamentary Party’s grass roots, remained the largest 
nationalist group. More important possibly is the reported inactivity of 
moderate nationalist factions along with the Unionist clubs and UVF, while the 
Irish Volunteers and Sinn Fein were reported as being ‘secretly active’. The 
table provides an invaluable backdrop on the condition of the county during the 
period.
Cavan along with the other Ulster counties from 1918 on was again on 
the verge of civil war. Sinn Fein was intent on implementing its program ‘by 
any and every means’, and coupled with the ‘politics of exaltation’ 
confrontation between Unionists and nationalists in Ulster was a foregone 
conclusion.4 The East Cavan by-election of 1918 was in many ways the starting 
point that fundamentally changed the course of the county’s and indeed the 
island’s political history and future. ‘It was important to Sinn Fein as it was 
their first electoral success in Ulster.’5 Afterwards in the general election of the 
same year the Irish Party ‘conceded a walkover to Sinn Fein both in Leitrim 
and Cavan.’6 Arthur Griffith was again elected in East Cavan and Peter Paul 
Galtigan was now elected the abstentionist Sinn Fein MP for West Cavan.7
3
See table tw o ‘List o f  Political associations on 31 January 1918’ p27
4 Roy Foster, M odem  Ireland 1600 -  1972 (Oxford, 1989) pp  490-494
5 Father Dan Gallogly, ‘Patrick F innegan and the b irth  o f  the Irish Free State 1900 to  1923’ in Breifne: 
Journal o f  Cum ann Seanchais Bhreifne. viii no. 1, (1989-1990) p660
6 Ibid p660
7 B rian M. W alker ed, Parliam entary election results in Ireland 1918-92 (Dublin, 1992) p5
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Both Unionist and nationalist groupings took routes almost completely 
independent of each other. The republican ideology espoused in the infamous 
‘Proclamation of the republic’ in April 1916 in many ways gets to the root of 
the Irish dilemma.
The Irish republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the 
allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The 
republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights 
and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its 
resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the 
whole nation and all its parts, cherishing all the people of 
the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences 
carefully fostered by an alien government, which have 
divided the minority from the majority in the past8
Nationalists could not reconcile Unionism within their ideology or recognise as 
a fact its existence in Ireland, except as another manifestation of the British 
occupation. While Irish nationalists maintained their tunnel vision, and directed 
their entire grievance at the ‘old enemy’ viewing Unionists as deluded and 
misinformed. Both movements continued on their divergent courses.
Cavan had become a Sinn Fein stronghold from a nationalist perspective 
and this fact was also undeniable to the government, its agencies and possibly 
more importantly, by Ulster Unionist leadership. The activities of local loyalist 
groups within the county was surprisingly low key between 1918 and 1922 to 
the point where the RIC recorded their organisations although still extant as 
‘inactive’.9 The local Unionist leaders instead concentrated their efforts at 
provincial and now to a greater degree at national levels. Lord Famham was 
now the chairman of the Irish Unionist Alliance, an organisation representing 
Unionists on an all-Ireland basis. He continued through this turbulent period to 
give prominence to, and lead the cause of Cavan Unionism. When in 1920 the 
British government introduced the Government of Ireland Bill to the House of 
Commons, on the basis of a partitionist settlement of the ‘Irish question’ giving
8 ‘Proclam ation o f  the republic’ in  E. Curtis ed and R .B. M cDow ell ed, Irish historical docum ents 
1172-1922 (London. 1943)
9 See table 3
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Ireland two devolved parliaments, one for the six north-eastern counties and 
one for the remaining twenty-six. He was to the fore in arguing against it. The 
Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) decided they would not oppose the bill to the 
frustration of the delegates from Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal. They pleaded 
with the council to reconsider, and in their defence produced a pamphlet 
entitled Ulster and Home Rule: no partition o f  Ulster which argued on 
economic, geographical and sectarian grounds that it would be illogical to 
exclude their counties. Belfast the pamphlet argued ‘had traditionally been seen 
as the commercial capital of Ulster and it was argued that all trade, business 
and railways in Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal were thus connected with it.’10 
‘The G N R [Great Northern Railway] runs direct from the town of Cavan 
through the county of Monaghan to Belfast. If a barrier is t be enacted between 
our counties and Belfast, it will be injurious to all.’11 The council however 
dismissed the supplications of the south Ulster delegates. On 10 March 1920 
Lord Famham, the Cavan representative, passing the following motion before 
the body, made a renewed attempt to convince the UUC to rethink their 
decision.
That this council abiding by its Covenant refuses to accept 
any kind of government which does not include the whole 
geographical province of Ulster and calls upon its 
parliamentary leaders to take such steps as may be 
necessary to see that the term Northern Ireland in the 
permanent bill is altered to include the whole province of 
Ulster12
The council refused to support the motion and went further by stating ‘that as 
the new bill recognised the right of the six north-eastern counties to separate 
treatment... They should not assume responsibility for attempting to defeat 
it.’13 The Unionists of south Ulster felt they were being systematically
10 Terence Dooley, The plight o f  M onaghan P rotestants (Dublin, 2000) p39
11 Ulster and Home Rule: no partition o f  Ulster, pam phlet issued by the U lster Unionist Council 
delegates o f  Cavan, M onaghan and D onegal in 1920, Public R ecord  O ffice o f  N orthern Ireland 
D/1545/8
12 Terence Dooley, The plight o f  M onaghan Protestants (Dublin, 2000) p40
13 Ibid  p40
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sidelined, by their own brethren, and the stunned delegates from Cavan, along 
with their Monaghan and Donegal associates believed they had no other 
options left open to them, when they resigned from the UUC.14
The Ulster Guardian an Ulster Unionist provincial newspaper took up 
the cause of the ‘betrayed’ three counties on the basis that the other delegates 
had by accepting the bill as it stood broken the ‘Ulster Solemn League and 
Covenant’. Under the headline ‘The Ulster Covenant’ it repeated the many 
statements of Sir Edward Carson on the Covenant back in 1912 and asked 
simply ‘Have words lost their meaning?’15
What do we mean by the covenant? We are going to make 
a mutual pledge, one with the other and any man who, 
having made the pledge, goes back on it, or fails, at the 
critical moment, let him beware that he is the betrayer of 
his brother... Ulstermen are not in the habit of breaking 
their contracts and once we have entered into it there is not 
a single man who signs it will ever go back on it until the 
day of his death... I ask no separate treatment for Ulster; 
we will take no separate treatment. That is not our policy 
and has never been our policy. We want no separate 
Parliament. We want and will take nothing less than the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom...16
Words had definitely lost their meaning, if present conditions were contrasted 
with the sentiments of ten years previous. Carson and the other delegates who 
supported the bill proposed by the government had unequivocally abandoned 
the Unionists of south Ulster in what the Unionists of Monaghan saw as ‘a 
selfish policy’, they had been abandoned by the UUC in order ‘not to endanger 
their precious six-county safety. ’ The Unionists of Co. Monaghan went 
further in protestation, at the Orange celebrations in the county in July 1920 
J.C.W Madden a leading Monaghan Unionist ‘went on to encourage his fellow
14 Ibid  p40
15 Carson, Edw ard (1854-1935) bom  in Co. Dublin, had a highly prolific professional and political 
career. Solicitor General for Ireland 1892 and E ngland 1900, M P for Trinity College, he becam e leader 
o f  the Irish U nionist Parliam entary P arty  in  1910 and leader o f  the U lster U nionists until 1921. See S. J. 
Connolly ed  The O xford C om panion to  Irish H istory (Oxford, 1998) p71 and The Ulster Guardian 1 
M ay 1920
16 Ibid  1 M ay 1920
17 Terence Dooley, The plight o f  M onaghan Protestants (Dublin, 2000) p40
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Orangemen to owe allegiance to a southern parliament should it ever be 
established.’18 Lord Famham was relentless in his canvassing of British 
opinion. He tried desperately to reverse the situation. In a letter addressed to all 
the government MPs, he pleaded on behalf of the ‘Irish Unionist Alliance’.
We speak with knowledge of what is going on in Ireland, 
which few in England appear to understand. There are two 
forces at work in Ireland to-day—the forces of treason, 
which seek to drive the last vestige of British 
constitutional authority, and the forces of loyalty... we 
appeal to you to stand firm before our country is reduced 
to a second Russia. The very lives of your loyal fellow 
subjects are now at stake. Their liberties have long since 
vanished. Insist that the Government shall tell the country 
the truth... and insist that they shall apply their undivided 
attention to the task of restoring law and order before the 
remaining land-marks of civilization are swept away. In 
the name of honour, we appeal to you.19
The pleas and protestations of the Cavan Unionists and their brethren in south 
Ulster fell on deaf ears, and they were left alone, abandoned, and virtually 
impotent. With their organizations intact, armed and well drilled, yet because 
they were now no longer part of the greater Ulster Unionist movement they 
were forced to ride out the revolution as it reached its culmination both north 
and south. When King George opened the Parliament of Northern Ireland in 
1921, the story of Unionism in Cavan was virtually over.
Much of Ulster had maintained, however artificially, in what would 
become ‘Northern Ireland’, it’s traditional Irish Parliamentary Party versus the 
Ulster Unionists. With Cavan now adopting the increasingly separatist Sinn 
Fein, it was almost diametrically different to the rest of Ulster and conditions in 
the county reflected in many ways what was happening in the southern 
provinces. In July 1920 the Inspector General in his synopsis of the County 
Inspectors report stated ‘Sinn Fein is stronger in Cavan than in any other Ulster
18 Ibid  p40
15>Copy o f  letter sent to  the  governm ent M Ps on 5 M ay 1915, by L ord  Fam ham , as C hairm an o f  the 
Irish Unionist Alliance, in Fam ham  Papers, P R O N ID 3975/E /11/16
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county.’ Even County Monaghan, the closest comparable county had fielded 
a Unionist candidate in the election of 1918. The Unionists of Cavan could 
offer no such opposition. This would have consequences also when the Anglo- 
Irish war broke out in 1919. Cavan Unionists and the local UVF were mere 
spectators on the political future of their county. The war, as it unfolded in 
Cavan, according to Father Dan Gallogly was very much a mild affair, in 
comparison with the sectarian conflicts that broke out in the other counties of 
the province and the hostilities in the south, in particular Munster.
True, there was an amount of activity -  burning RIC 
barracks recently vacated to prevent them being 
reoccupied, a number of minor ambushes, the cutting of 
roads and felling of trees across roads to prevent the 
mobility of the British army and the police and the boycott 
of Belfast goods following the pogroms there in 1920. On 
a more serious note there was also a number of shootings 
of RIC constables.21
All the same Cavan was at war, and although the role the county played 
at a national level in the military struggle for national determination may 
indeed have been small, the county did play a part. Police reports of the time do 
not convey as conditions to be as placid as Gallogly suggests. The RIC report 
for June 1919 tells quite a different story.
Great hostility was shown to the police who could not 
obtain transport anywhere and were compelled to go about 
everywhere armed in sufficient strength to resist attack... 
There were several instances of holding up of the mail and 
damaging Government property. On the 21 June a number 
of men armed with weapons of destruction gathered in 
Belturbet apparently to destroy the military barracks there 
but were prevented by the timely arrival of a party of 
solders there from Cavan.22
20 Inspector G enerals R eport, July 1920, PRO , C O  904/112
21 Father D an G allogly, ‘Patrick F innegan and the b irth  o f  the  Irish Free State 1900 to  1923 ’ in Breifiie: 
Journal o f  Cum ann Seanchais Bhreithe. viii no. 1, (1989-1990) p661
22 Inspector G enerals Report, June 1919, PRO, CO 904/109
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Some short-lived respite was granted to ‘Crown Forces’ in January 1920. ‘The 
proclaiming of Sinn Fein and kindred societies has had a quieting effect on 
those bodies in this county. ’ And yet this was still not enough in the same 
report it was noted that one ‘Mr Reilly of Killydoon [was] arrested for posting 
up and having in possession posters of Dail Eireann loan.’24 By July 1920 
conditions had rapidly disintegrated for the British police in Cavan. The county 
was now in a very ‘unsatisfactory state’ with nearly forty offences of and 
‘indictable nature being reported. The majority of these directly attributable to
9 SSinn Fein. ’ The police report lists a sample of some of the more serious 
offences. ‘A police patrol was fired on near Belturbet by a party of Sinn 
Feiners who had been raiding a mail car and the sergeant was wounded. An 
attempt was made to derail a mail train, there were several raids for arms, cases 
of robbery, malicious injury and intimidation.’26 The police reports contrast 
pointedly with Dan Gallogly’s analysis of the war being merely a ‘mild affair’.
Local government in the county from 1918 onwards sympathised with 
the Sinn F£in cause, and the minutes of county council meetings display the 
enormous shift that had taken place in political opinion in the county. From 
1919 Sinn F£in controlled Cavan County Council (CCC). The Inspector 
General in his synopsis of the County Inspector report stated. ‘The Local 
Government Elections throughout the county resulted in large Sinn Fein 
majorities due to good organization and intimidation.’27 At the ‘ordinary 
meeting’ of CCC on 15 October 1918 a resolution was adopted from City Hall, 
Dublin ‘in connection with the recent arrests of public men in Ireland... Copies 
of same to be sent to the United States and French Consuls, Dublin. ’28 The 
council was clearly vocal in its condemnation of the governments treatment of 
Sinn Fein activists and this was repeated time and time again at ordinary and 
committee meetings of the council. On the 13 February 1920 the Finance
23 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, January 1920, PRO, CO 904/111
24 Ibid
25 Inspector G enerals Report, July 1920, PRO, CO 904/112
16 Ibid
27 Inspector G enerals Report, June 1919, PRO , CO 904/112
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Committee ‘decided unanimously, that as a protest against the treatment of 
Irishmen detained in prison without any charge being preferred, against them 
no business be done.’ Again on the 13 April another resolution was moved 
‘by the Chairman and seconded by James O’Reilly -  That a protest against the 
brutal treatment by the government and its employees of the many Irishmen 
presently held without trial in Mountjoy Prison, we do not transact any further 
business today.’30 The first shots the nationalists of Cavan fired in the War of 
Independence were not bullets but political statements. The resolutions and 
motions adopted and passed by this body appeared regularly in the Anglo-Celt. 
Cavan nationalists although their military activities have been found lacking by 
some historical commentators would fight an unquestionably effective 
propaganda campaign.
Dâil Éireann formally met in session for the first time on 21 January 
1919 in the Mansion House, Dublin. ‘Early in 1919 Carson received a
f
summons in Irish to attend Dâil Eireann, an assembly of the elected 
representatives of the Irish nation... The amused Ulster Unionist leader kept it 
as a souvenir and their was laughter in the Dâil when the reading out of his 
name at roll call was greeted by silence.’31 All humour aside the new body set 
about the difficult task creating a national government for Ireland, in opposition 
to the British régime, when it formally declared the republic as proclaimed in 
1916. The partition of the country was not recognised by nationalists either 
within the six north eastern counties or in the remainder of the country and 
Teachta Dâlai (TDs) attended from the entire island.32 Cavan County Council 
did not formally recognise the authority of the Dâil until 19 June 1920, but 
when it did it offered its frill and unconditional allegiance.
28 M inutes o f  the m eetings o f  Cavan County Council, 1912 -  1927, in the council offices, C ourt House,
Cavan, p59
291 bid  p i 24
30 Ibid pi 20
31 Jonathan Bardon, A history o f  U lster (Belfast, 1992) p462
32 Teachta Dala (Deputy o f  Dai 11' ireann) w as the title accredited to  those elected to  the H ouse o f  
Com mons in the 1918 general election w ho chose instead to  convene in Ireland and form  a  national 
government.
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It was then proposed by the chairman, seconded by the 
vice chairman, and unanimously adopted. ‘That this 
council of the elected representatives of the county of 
Cavan, at a duly convened meeting hereby acknowledge 
the authority of Dail Eireann as the duly elected 
government of the Irish people and undertake to give 
effect to all decrees duly promulgated by the said Dail 
Eireann in so far as the same affects this council.’ ‘That 
copies of this resolution be forwarded to the republican 
minister for foreign affairs for transmission to the 
governments of Europe, and to the president and chairman 
of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the 
USA.’33
The county council had come down on the side of the provisional government 
and threw its lot in with the republican war effort. This was a big commitment 
as the British authorities had the previous September declared the Dail an 
illegal assembly. Before it had been proscribed by the Crown, it had begun the 
initial stages of setting up the workings of a national government, with 
ministries mirroring the British administration in Ireland. The CCC 
representatives passed a number of resolutions to work within the new system 
and formally extricate themselves from recognising or complying with the 
British government. The council agreed ‘that no books or documents belonging 
to this council be produced or any inspection whatsoever permitted to any 
inspector, auditor, or other persons except those appointed and given authority 
by Dail Eireann with the consent of this council.’34 The resolve of the body was 
challenged when ‘the constabulary authorities sent in the accounts for 
conveyance of prisoners, weights and measures, food and drugs for June and 
September quarters; both were now submitted and a proposal to pay same 
[was] unanimously rejected.’ Again on another occasion it was moved ‘that 
the accounts of Cavan County Council be not submitted to the Local 
Government Board auditor on the 22 October; No dissent.’36 The council 
resolutely showed where its loyalties were when a Tetter from Local
33 M inutes o f  the meetings o f  Cavan County Council, 1912 -  1927, in  the council offices, C ourt House,
Cavan, p i 26 
M Ibid pl41
35 IbidpU7
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Government Department (Dail) [was received], asking when the accounts of 
the past half year would be ready. [It was] read and instructions given.’37 
The minutes of the council meetings also throw some light on the 
attitudes of the local nationalist community and the conditions they were 
experiencing. At the Quarterly meeting of Cavan County Council on the 5 
August 1920 it was proposed by Mr Fallon and seconded by Charles 
Fitzpatrick. ‘That we appreciate the manly conduct of those Cavan men who 
resigned from the English police force rather than cooperate in the burnings, 
pillage and bloodshed ordered to be carried out against their own kith and 
kin.’38 Of course the fact they were being shot at by their own ‘kith and kin’ if 
they continued in their posts was not recognised as motivation for the timely 
resignations. Police intelligence conveys similar stories from the government 
side in marked contrast to the councillor’s resolution. ‘The police were largely 
boycotted and unable to do ordinary police work. About 15 magistrates in the
39county were obliged mainly by intimidation to resign their commissions... ’
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) as the Irish Volunteers had now become 
known was now the recognised army of the Irish republic under the supposed 
control of the Dail. They undertook policing duties in areas controlled or under 
partial control of the provisional government. In many ways the provisional 
government was now shadowing the Dublin Castle organisation. This made the 
IRA as much open targets as Crown forces. Cavan County Council extended its 
sympathy to the relatives of the Tate Commandant Seamus Eagan who was 
killed by enemy forces while discharging Volunteer duties.’40 Neither side was 
immune to the death, destruction and divisions brought on by the war and 
clearly Cavan was not escaping.
In October 1920 the Catholic Church in Kilmore organised a ‘novena for 
peace’, speaking in his cathedral in Cavan town Dr Finegan encouraged the
36 Ibid  p i 48
37 Ibid  p l4 8
38 Ibid  p i39
39 Inspector Generals Report, July 1920, PRO, CO 904/112
40 M inutes o f  the m eetings o f  C avan County Council, 1912 -  1927, in  the council offices, C ourt House, 
Cavan, p i 39
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people to keep praying ‘for the continued immunity of their county from the 
terrible trials to which other places have been subjected.’41 The people o f 
Cavan clearly wanted peace not war and The Anglo-Celt reported ‘it is 
doubtful if ever at the most successful mission or retreat held in Cavan 
cathedral more men and women attended mass each morning and received 
Holy Communion as during the novena which concluded last Saturday.’42 The 
nationalists o f Cavan seemed on the surface however still soundly behind the 
war effort and Sinn Fdin in the General Election o f 1921 under the new system 
or proportional representation Cavan returned three uncontested Sinn Fein TDs
t ,
to Dail Eireann Peter Paul Galligan and Arthur Griffith were again elected and 
they were joined this time by Sean Milroy 43 But defeat was not going to be the 
price of peace and nationalists were intent on keeping their movement 
organised and disciplined. The Dail in 1920 had imposed a ban on Belfast 
products in an attempt to break the resolve of Ulster Unionists. In Cavan the 
local IRA enforced the decree. The RIC intercepted a letter from the ‘West 
Cavan Boycott Committee’ to a trader who had breached the command.
A Chara,
After fully investigating your case the above 
committee have fined you £20 for trading with firms 
within the prohibited area. The fine must be paid before 
the 14 October, Otherwise you will again appear on the 
black list.44
The Cavan IRA was able to enforce Dail decrees quite effectively, with the 
establishment o f Sinn Fein courts in Cavan. The RIC saw almost the complete 
erosion of their role in the county and they became mere intelligence gatherers 
for Dublin Castle. The County Inspectors monthly report for October reported 
one such Sinn Fein court sitting and the history behind it. The Hibernian Bank, 
Bailieboro town had been held-up by three armed men and £1,300 had been
41 Father Dan Gallogly, ‘Patrick F innegan and the birth o f  the Irish Free S tate 1900 to 1923’ in Breifhe 
Journal o f  Cum ann Seanchais B hreifne. viii no. 1 ,(1989-1990) p662
42 ¡bid  p662
1! Brian M. W alker ed, Parliam entary election results in Ireland 1918-92 (Dublin, 1992) pp 99-101
44 County Inspector’s Confidential M onthly Report, O ctober 1921, PRO, C O  904/116
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taken. The RIC arrested three suspects James Duffy, Phil Crossan and Thomas 
McPhillips. The men were released without charge due to a lack o f evidence. 
They were ‘arrested afterwards by Sinn Fein who took them to a secret 
location... These men wont give any information as to what transpired while in 
Sinn Fein custody.’ The money was anonymously returned sometime after45 It 
was now quite clear who was policing County Cavan.
When the truce between the IRA and the British army was agreed in July 
of 1921, Dail Eireann and the IRA had become the de facto  government and 
army of the majority o f the populous o f County Cavan. The county council had 
accepted unequivocally the authority o f the Dail and in two successive general 
elections the electorate o f the county had returned Sinn Fein TDs to the newly 
formed Dail. The IRA was policing the county and Sinn Fein courts were 
administering justice. The voice o f more moderate constitutional nationalism 
had been silenced in the county, but still it remained in the form o f the UIL, 
which as the police report demonstrated was in 1920 still the largest political 
organisation in Cavan. The fact that Sinn Fein ran the two general elections 
uncontested after the by-election of 1918 cloaked the feet that many of the 
divisions that divided nationalists in the past still remained. For Unionists in 
County Cavan it was quite another story. They had reluctantly acquiesced in 
developments as they unfolded within the county and had desperately pleaded 
with their brethren in the north o f the province not to abandon them and all to 
no avail. In 1921 their position within Cavan seemed futile and their efforts 
without in vain, but their continued existence was testament to the unresolved 
divisions within the county.
45 Ibid
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Conclusion
The provisional government had in July 1921 won a victory over the British. 
This was brought about in no part by the escalation o f IRA activities from 1920 
onwards and the increased political pressure being placed on the British 
government by the Dominions and United States, who wanted to see a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict. Lloyd George and his administration agreed to a  truce 
and subsequently to negotiations while the IRA were still in the field, and more 
importantly while the institutions o f the provisional government were still to a 
degree functioning. The truce brought many o f the heretofore on the run ‘rebel 
leaders’ like Michael Collins out o f hiding and into the public light. This made 
a return to the covert style guerrilla warfare o f the IRA difficult if  not 
impossible. Still a major victory had been achieved. The British had by 
agreeing to a truce conceded at least in essence the status o f belligerent to the 
IRA and by agreeing to negotiate a settlement with the rebel leadership, 
recognised the de facto  if not the de jure  existence of Dail Eireann, as 
representative o f the Irish people. After preliminary negotiations between 
Lloyd George and Eamonn de Valera it was agreed to hold a conference in 
London ‘to ascertain how the association o f Ireland with the community of 
nations known as the British Empire might best be reconciled with Irish 
national aspirations.’1 De Valera under the auspices of the Dail chose Michael 
Collins and the Cavan TD Arthur Griffith to lead the delegation of 
plenipotentiaries to London, to conclude a treaty on the future o f Ireland. What 
they returned with was less than the Holy Grail, recognition o f the independent 
Irish republic. Dominion status creating an ‘Irish Free State’ was all the British 
were prepared to concede. The Irish would also have to take an oath o f 
allegiance to the British monarch. Northern Ireland was to remain, but a 
Boundary Commission was to be set up to revise the border between north and
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south. The Irish delegates signed the agreement and returned to Dublin to have 
it ratified by Dail Eireann.
Roy Foster argues that a treaty was made possible because ‘Ulster 
Unionist Ireland had already been catered for. The Treaty o f 1921 did not 
enable Partition to take place as sometimes assumed; Partition cleared the way 
for the Treaty.’2 This was possibly so from a British standpoint, but the reality 
as expressed by the Irish electorate in two successive general elections was that 
TDs attended Dail Eireann from within the newly formed Northern Ireland. It 
was not ideologically compatible with Irish republican thinking to accept 
partition o f the country. Irish nationalists had never recognised the 
‘Government o f Ireland Act’ and had continued after 1920 in some areas o f 
Northern Ireland to control local councils, which gave allegiance to the Dail 
and not the newly formed parliament in Belfast. When Dail Eireann ratified the 
treaty on the 6 January 1922 by sixty-four votes to fifty-seven it gave in fact 
tacit recognition to partition. The bloody civil war that ensued the ratification 
of the Treaty in the south centred not on partition but the ‘Oath o f Allegiance’ 
to the British monarch. Those who had sworn an oath to the Irish republic 
would not take such an oath and viewed those that did as traitors to the cause. 
The general election o f June 1922 gave a substantial majority to those in favour 
o f the Treaty; still it was not until April o f 1923 that de Valera called off the 
republican campaign. Even before the dust had settled and the civil war was 
over, the provisional government took over from Dublin Castle and were 
promoting under Collins the so-called ‘Border W ar’. This war united the south 
Ulster IRA who continued to raid into the new northern state. The Provisional 
Government were now in control o f the institutions which only months before 
they were intent on destroying. With the reigns o f power now firmly in hand 
the government o f the Irish Free State turned its attention northward to Ulster.
County Cavan found itself within the new Irish Free State in 1922. This 
had by no means been a certainty. ‘The [British] government had tried for a
1 S. J. Connolly, The Oxford C om panion to  Irish H istory (Oxford, 1998) p i  5
2 R oy Foster, M odem  Ireland 1600 -  1972 (Oxford, 1989) p503
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nine-county Ulster, stressing that religious balance in such a unit would 
facilitate eventual reunification, Ulster Unionists insisted on a six-county unit 
that would contain a heavy weighted protestant majority.’3 They decided to 
secede completely from the south, as was their prerogative. ‘Many knew that 
they had gained a near-impregnable position, and saw it as the effective 
legalization o f Carson’s pre-war provisional government.’4 For south Ulster 
Unionists it was a betrayal, surprisingly they followed the government line 
stating in their pamphlet Ulster and Home Rule: No partition o f  Ulster that 
such a parliament would be parochial and contain too large a Unionist 
(protestant) majority. Regardless o f all this the simple reality was in 1922 they 
had become citizens o f the newly created Free State. For south Ulster 
nationalists as well as their cross border compatriots the border was simply 
ignored. When civil war broke out and engulfed the south, local folklore in the 
county maintains that the Cavan IRA stayed neutral, waiting for the fighting to 
end, so that they could set about the task o f reclaiming the rest of the province. 
There may be a degree o f truth in this. ‘On the 11 February 1922, a train 
carrying a number o f B Specials was halted at Clones by the IRA. One o f the 
Specials seems to have panicked and opened fire, killing Commandant Matt 
Fitzpatrick o f the IRA. In the gun battle that ensued, four B Specials were 
killed, one was wounded and five were taken prisoner.’5 Tensions grew 
afterwards along the frontier with Northern Ireland and intensified the ‘Border 
W ar’ and IRA brigades sniped across the frontier at their opposites the B 
Specials. The common enemy across the border saved Cavan much o f the 
bitterness and death that was the civil war. ‘Cavan and Leitrim were fortunate 
to have escaped the horrific violence that characterised the civil war elsewhere, 
especially the south. Both had a share o f petty violence, bank and post office
3 Ibid  p503
4 Ibid  p503
5 Clones is a  m arket tow n in south  County M onaghan, o n  the border w ith C ounty Cavan and County 
Fermanagh. In 1922 the tow n had one o f  the main hub term inus for the rail netw ork o f  south Ulster. 
A lso Terence D ooley, The Plight o f  M onaghan protestants (Dublin, 2000) p45
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robberies, disruption of roads and railways, attacks on barracks recently 
occupied by the Free State army and general lawlessness.’6
Article twelve of the Anglo-Irish treaty o f 1922 stipulated the setting up 
of a ‘Boundary Commission’ to revise the political boundary between the north 
and south of Ireland. ‘Constitutional Irish Nationalists o f the early 1920s saw 
the treaty as a ‘stepping stone’ to eventual Irish unity and complete national 
independence from Great Britain. Their phraseology underlies their realization 
if not acceptance o f the political realities o f the time.’7 Nationalists had 
accepted the reality o f partition, but only as a temporary anomaly. ‘A more 
concerted rejection of partition was expressed in the propaganda campaign co­
ordinated from October 1922 by the North-Eastern Boundary Bureau... The 
bureau maintained its activity throughout the prolonged attempt to redraw the 
border through a boundary commission, being dissolved only early in 1926.’ 
This so called Boundary Bureau was set up under the directorship of Kevin 
O’Shiel TD for Co Louth but originally an Ulsterman and a catholic from 
County Tyrone. The bureau employed all the institutions now at the provisional 
governments disposal including the Registrar Generals office and the Ordnance 
Survey o f Ireland. In 1923 the bureau produced a book entitled Handbook o f  
the Ulster question, which categorically argued against partition on any basis.
The object of this Handbook is to assemble and arrange in 
convenient form all the material facts relating to the Ulster 
question generally, and in particular to that aspect that 
comes within the purview of the Boundary Commission, 
as provided by Article 12 of the Treaty between Great 
Britain and Ireland... The facts and figures contained in 
the book are derived from authoritative sources, which 
cannot be seriously challenged. The conclusions drawn 
from those facts and figures, viewed from every angle, are 
against any form of Partition, and particularly against the 
form of partition set up by the Act of 19209
6 Father D an Gallogly, ‘Patrick F innegan and the birth  o f  the Irish Free S tate 1900 to  1923’ in Breifne: 
Journal o f  Cum ann Seanchais Bhreifne. viii no. 1, (1989-1990) p668
7 O liver M e Caul ‘K evin O ’Shiel and the boundary bureau.’ U npublished essay p i
8 D avid Fitzpatrick, The tw o Irelands 1912-1939 (Oxford, 1998) p i 38
9 Kevin R. O’Shiel, Handbook of the Ulster question (Dublin, 1923) pv
49
For argumentative purposes he took the whole province o f Ulster as the unit his 
study, (including County Cavan) instead of the new six-county statelet of 
Northern Ireland. In close similarities with the contentions o f the south Ulster 
Unionists earlier in 1920, the study demonstrates the disproportionate amount 
of nationalists within the new northern frontier and the adverse economic 
effects that partition would create for Ulster and indeed for Ireland. The 
boundary commission as outlined in the Treaty never convened. Instead the 
British nominated a delegate on behalf o f Northern Ireland who would not 
recognise such a body. The body was hampered over allegations o f legitimacy 
therefore from the start. Regardless it amounted to nothing alleviating the fears 
of the Ulster Unionists. The findings of the commission were leaked to the 
press in 1925. The commission collapsed as a result and its recommendations 
were indefinitely shelved. The boundary between Northern Ireland and the 
Irish Free State remained intact. County Cavan had remained the southern 
frontier between the two new states.
Geography was centrally important right through this turbulent period of 
Irish History. Territory was intrinsic to both the Ulster Unionist and nationalist 
movements. For nationalists the island o f Ireland was the territorial expression 
of the nation, while for Ulster Unionists the province o f Ulster was the physical 
manifestation of the movement. These simple facts were embodied in such 
documents as ‘The Ulster solemn league and covenant’ and ‘The Proclamation 
of the Republic’. In Cavan the importance of these beliefs during this period 
cannot be understated. Cavan Unionists were aware o f their precarious 
minority position in the County, a mere twenty percent o f the population, but 
they were also aware o f their majority in Ulster. They were to cling to this idea 
as embodied in the infamous ‘covenant’ right up to 1920 when a whole new 
series of forces came into play. Cavan nationalists too would and could not 
contemplate anything other then their objective o f independence for the country 
in its entirety. The polarized attitudes the county contained could not be 
reconciled.
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The reality o f post independence Ireland and devolved Northern Ireland 
was that south Ulster entered a political limbo o f sorts. Cavan in 1912 had been 
an integral part o f the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; in 1922 it 
had become a border county in the fledgling Irish Free State. Cavan was 
undeniably an Ulster county; it was also a reminder o f the divided province 
from which it had sprung. For Irish nationalists and Ulster Unionists Cavan 
was a symbol o f their ‘incomplete revolutions’. Cavan along with the two other 
Ulster counties o f Monaghan and Donegal were the Free States foothold in 
Ulster, reminding both Unionists and Nationalists that neither had really 
achieved their goals, but compromised quite dramatically on their aspirations. 
The legacy of the revolutionary period in Cavan was almost bitter sweet, it was 
scarred by betrayal in many respects, it was also marked by economic and 
demographic decline brought about in no small part by the frontier with 
Northern Ireland which cut off much o f the county’s natural hinterland and 
infrastructure. For the betrayed Unionists o f Cavan it was now time to 
acquiesce with the new regime, and to make their way within their new 
surroundings as best they could. For the nationalists o f the county what they 
had achieved in 1922 was far beyond what they ever had realistically hoped for 
back in 1912. The political divisions that had ravaged the county for ten years 
had finally run their course and Cavan was once again at least on the surface at 
peace.
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